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Abstract: 
We analyze the impact of a labour market reform at the margin (an easier use of 
temporary contracts launched in Spain in 1984) across generations. As this type of 
reforms applies to new entrants into the labour market (or, in general, new hired 
workers), we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate a long-lasting effect on 
the mean temporary employment rates for generations entering into the labour market 
after the labour market respect to those already in the labour market. The results show a 
relatively small impact related with the reform at the margin. By educational levels, the 
estimated effect of the reform at the margin on the mean temporary employment rate is 
close to zero for those with university level for both genders. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1980s, all Western countries implemented different labour market reforms 
in order to increase labour market flexibility and, thereby, employment (Booth et al., 
2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Homlund and Storrie, 2002; Dolado et al., 2002; 
Barbieri and Sestito, 2008). Everywhere, these reforms were implemented as gradual 
and/or partial changes of the institutional framework of the labour market. A type of this 
partial or gradual reform was the flexibility at the margin, i.e., affecting only to the new 
entrants in the labour market and those moving to new jobs. 
Temporary and fixed-term contracts are probably the most important type of 
flexibility at the margin. Originally, they decrease hiring costs, but at the same time they 
are also characterized by much lower firing costs. Usually, temporary contracts have 
low or even null severance payments and very low bureaucratic costs linked to the end 
of the contract in contrast to an open-ended contract. Many European countries have 
promoted, under different regimes, the use of temporary and fixed-term contracts, but 
Spain is the most prominent example. While in the beginning in the 1980s, the 
proportion of wage and salary workers with a temporary contract (the temporary 
employment rate, TER) was around 10 per cent and concentrated on construction and 
tourism industry (Fina et al., 1989), in the mid 1990s it rose to 33 per cent and affected 
to all economic activities (Toharia and Malo, 2000; Dolado et al., 2002), remaining 
around 30 percent even after the implementation of different labour market reforms 
aiming to decrease this rate in 1994, 1997 and 2006. In addition, the widespread of 
temporary contracts is not mainly linked to temporary work agencies as they were 
forbidden until 1994. In fact, the TER was above 30 per cent when these agencies began 
their activity, and nowadays they manage around 16 per cent of the total gross flow of 
temporary contracts (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). On the above grounds, Spain is 
probably the most appropriate country to study any topic related to temporary contracts. 
Previous research on temporary work has focused on the effects of fixed-term 
contracts on training provision, work injuries, or on specific groups such as young 
people, women or low-skilled workers. Although some authors have analyzed the 
relevance of different workers’ characteristics (as age) of temporary workers (for 
example, Kahn, 2007), to our knowledge there is not previous research about the 
relevance of temporary contracts on long-term working trajectories using a generation 
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approach. We will apply this approach to analyze the impact of the labour market 
reform fostering temporary contracts on working lives from a long-term perspective, 
using generations (defined as birth cohorts) as the main unit of analysis and the 
aggregate temporary employment rate of different generations at different ages as the 
dependent variable. In these terms, this article adds to the current interest in the long-
term effects of flexibility in two-tier labour markets, originated by labour market 
reforms at the margin in different countries (Boeri, 2009). Therefore, we will check 
whether there is a long-term impact on the temporary employment rate of different 
generations according to their different exposure to the labour market reform at the 
margin easing the use of temporary contracts by firms. 
Probably, the most prominent challenge is how to evaluate the impact of a 
labour market reform at the margin. After the implementation of such reform all 
individuals are exposed to be hired using a temporary contract. At first sight, there is not 
any ‘non-treated’ group as the exposure is complete for young generations entering into 
the labour market after the legal change and the exposure is partial (not zero) for older 
generations already in the labour market when the reform was implemented. Therefore, 
the labour market reform at the margin potentially affected to the working lives of all 
individuals. Notice that our research will not compare working lives of individuals 
affected by the reform with a counterfactual of working lives of individuals not affected 
by such reform. Such comparison is impossible, because we only observe the ‘real 
world’ with the implementation of this change in labour market regulation. What we 
can compare is the working lives of those entering into the labour market after the 
implementation of this legal change with the working lives of those already in the 
labour market before the reform. In this vein, we will focus on estimating the long-term 
impact (if any) of the labour market reform at the margin of 1984 on the mean TER of 
younger cohorts along their observed working lives. Therefore, we are looking for a sort 
of ‘temporary contracts trap’ (or ‘long-term precariousness’) for younger generations 
consisting on a relatively higher TER during their whole life course. This is relevant 
because a higher TER can negatively affect to crucial vital events as relevant delays 
leaving parents’ home, declining fertility rates, lower probability of being eligible for a 
mortgage, poorer career prospects, higher risk of unemployment, etc. According to this 
rationale, we present a regression discontinuity design to isolate whether there is a long-
run effect of the labour market reform at the margin implemented in 1984 on younger 
  
4 
 
cohorts (i.e., on those cohorts entering into the labour market after such 
implementation), respect to older cohorts already in the labour market when the legal 
change was implemented. Our results will be disaggregated by educational level and 
gender. 
We use micro-data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1987 to 
2010. To focus on generations, we will use the micro-data from the Spanish LFS to 
provide a novel picture of information by generational groups (i.e. birth cohort groups) 
along their life cycles. For this purpose we use artificial (synthetic) cohorts’ 
methodology, widely used in Demography and Epidemiology. We use this data 
aggregation in descriptive and econometric analyses. 
We will show that at a descriptive level it is obvious that younger cohorts have a 
higher temporary employment rate at the beginning of their working careers, but 
according to their characteristics (educational level and gender) some of them have 
relatively faster declines in such rates. On the other hand, some workers experiment 
higher job mobility irrespective of their generation (as workers with a low educational 
level). Older cohorts have a higher share of workers with low educational levels and 
when these workers lose their jobs are also more relatively ‘exposed’ to a positive long-
term effect on their mean temporary employment rate along their working career (as 
they have a higher probability of being re-hired under the new legal regulation). In fact, 
the TER of older generations with a low educational level increased very rapidly just 
after the implementation of the legal reform. The regression discontinuity analysis 
shows that the long-run increases in the TER are rather low, especially for those with a 
university educational level, and even more if they are females. Therefore, although the 
observed differential in mean TER along the life cycle is the largest for younger cohorts 
of people with a university degree for cohorts closer to the discontinuity, such 
differences are not mainly linked to the reform at the margin but to differences between 
these cohorts. 
 
2 Background 
The extensive use of fixed-term and temporary contracts in Spain stems from the 
1984 labour market reform intended to foster employment providing more flexibility to 
firms (Toharia and Malo, 2000; Dolado et al., 2002). The legal reform in 1984 
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established a new type of temporary contract that allows firms to hire employees 
performing regular activities. Previously, temporary contracts existed, but they were 
mainly used for seasonal activities as in agriculture or tourism firms, or for economic 
activities with a very specific task as in the building sector, where many contracts are 
limited to the construction of the specified building, road, etc. (Fina et al., 1989).  
The 1984 reform was implemented amidst the international debate on labour 
market flexibility and, in the Spanish case, it was a response by the recently elected 
Socialist government to the pressures applied by employers, who would in fact have 
preferred a more sweeping reform (Dolado and Malo de Molina, 1985; Toharia and 
Malo, 2000).  Although the trade union UGT (which was very close to the Socialist 
Party) originally supported this legal reform, later this union jointly with the other main 
union (CCOO) heavily criticized this reform for increasing job instability and spreading 
temporary contracts to all industries. This legal reform led to a fast (and unexpected at 
that time1
In legal terms, the change was ‘small’ as there was only the introduction of a 
new type of contract available for employers and, therefore, not affecting to current 
employees only to job seekers expecting to be hired. However, the legal change was 
relevant because allowed a much easier use of this type of temporary contract as it was 
possible hiring workers for permanent tasks of the firm on a temporary basis. This was a 
remarkable novelty respect to the traditional foundations of the Spanish Labour Law.  
) increase in the TER, reaching 30 per cent by the beginning of the 1990s, and 
affecting more to women who reached rates slightly below 40 per cent in 1992 (see 
Figure 1). 
As there was a legal change implemented by a new government (with a political 
ideology markedly different respect to the previous government) and changing key 
concepts of Spanish Labour Law (in other words, ‘innovating’ in a way difficult to 
predict in that time), this legal reform can be considered as exogenous in terms that 
workers and employers could not anticipate this legal change in order to delay or to 
anticipate a relevant amount of key decisions affecting in the long term to the working 
                                                 
1 Later, many authors (for example, Dolado et al., 2002) linked this extensive use of temporary contracts 
by firms with the wide gap in firing costs respect to open-ended contracts. Although next labour market 
reforms tried to partially close this gap, de facto the firing costs gap has remained almost unchanged 
(García-Martínez and Malo, 2007). 
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lives of different generations. Here, manipulation by workers means that, for example, 
individuals enrolled in university anticipating the legal reform would quit their studies 
in order to be hired before the reform to decrease the risk to be hired with a temporary 
contract instead of an open-ended contract. This is not plausible because the expected 
returns of pursuing in university studies were higher than the alternative of being hired 
for a non-university job before the reform. In addition, the high TER reached later and 
its negative side effects were not anticipated by any researcher, labour practitioner, 
policy maker, etc. On the side of firms, it is possible to argue that some employers 
postponed hiring decisions in order to use a temporary contract for vacancies related 
with permanent tasks instead of using open-ended contracts before the reform. 
However, such manipulating behaviour must have been very limited to immediately 
before the legal change and without any relevant impact on working lives of different 
workers’ generations. As we said before, this legal change did not follow a years-long 
social and political debate. In fact, it was a change taken by a new government in the 
first part of its first legislature of fours years and affecting Labour Law in a way not 
easy to anticipate as the reform broke a key principle of the Spanish Labour Law 
tradition. On the above grounds, we will consider this reform at the margin as a 
discontinuity in terms of a regression discontinuity design. 
The spread of temporary contracts was so huge that negative effects became 
visible in the 1990s. Many authors have stressed that such a huge proportion of 
temporary and fixed-term contracts on total wage and salary workers has different 
unintended and worrying effects: (a) on economic performance as less probability of 
participating in training (Albert et al., 2005), a lower productivity growth (Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1994) or higher injury rates (Guadalupe, 2003); (b) on the postponement of 
family formation and fertility (Ahn and Mira, 2001; Adsera, 2004; McGrath and 
Keister, 2008); and (c) on working lives as a longer and more precarious period of 
labour market integration (OECD, 1998).  
In the two next decades, different legal changes in 1994, 1997 and 2006 have 
tried to decrease the aggregate TER of the Spanish economy. In 1994, the legal 
regulation of fixed-terms contracts was restricted and in 1997 some kinds of temporal 
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contracts were abolished2. Moreover, a new permanent contract with lower severance 
pay for dismissed workers was created although it was not applicable to all the new 
hires3
However, in general, all these reforms have had partial but small effects on the 
aggregate TER
 and financial subsidies for employers using permanent contracts were launched 
(Toharia and Malo, 2000). These financial subsidies were changed in 2006 (see Toharia 
et al., 2005 or Toharia and Cebrián, 2007). 
4 and it has remained around 30 per cent5
Concerning the effects of temporary contracts on labour trajectories, previous 
research focuses on the analysis of transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment (Toharia et al., 1998; Alba, 1998; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Hernánz, 
2003; Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). The main finding of these analyses is that fixed-
term contracts contribute to a high level of transitions between jobs, even for temporary 
to permanent jobs. On the other hand, descriptive evidence from administrative 
longitudinal records does not seem to show a ‘long-term trap’ in general, although 
several specific and small groups might remain for long time in temporary employment 
(Toharia and Cebrián, 2007). 
. Only very recently, since 
2007, we can see a slow decreasing change, providing descriptive evidence that the 
legal reform implemented in 2006 slightly decreased average TER (specially in the 
private sector and in small firms; Malo and González-Sánchez, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
relevant decrease observed in 2008 is not related with any policy but with the severe 
employment adjustment because of the current economic recession (heavily focused on 
temporary contracts and in the construction sector at the beginning and soon extended to 
the rest of the economy). 
Anyway, temporary contracts are mainly concentrated on new entrants, 
dominated by young people (everywhere, and not only in Spain; see, for example, 
Khan, 2007). Older people (those already in the labour market before the labour market 
                                                 
2 See, for example, García-Martínez and Malo (2007) and Malo y Toharia (2008) for further details on 
1994 and 1997 legal regulation reforms; on the 2006 reform see Toharia and Cebrián (2007). 
3 The exception was males aged 30-45 years old with unemployment spells below one year but in 2001 it 
was extended to other workers 
4 For instance, Kugler et al. (2002) obtain that the reform in 1997 seems to have had a positive net effect 
on permanent employment for young men and women but not for older men. 
5 Slightly below 30 per cent when considering exclusively the private sector (Dolado et al., 2002). 
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reform was implemented) will have temporary contracts when they are re-hired after a 
dismissal or when they have a delayed entry (or re-entry) into the labour market. Such 
situation for older workers would be usually more frequent for those with lower 
educational levels and for women with an intermittent working career because of family 
reasons. 
The unequal generational allocation of temporary contracts (and their costs and 
benefits) has been interpreted as an implicit intergenerational agreement (Garrido, 
1996). While temporary contracts (and short-term unemployment) are concentrated 
among young people who remain in their parents’ home, open-ended contracts and job 
security is concentrated among male breadwinners. Then, since the 1980s, parents 
(mainly husbands) were working under permanent contracts with a relatively higher 
employment security. They paid taxes to finance unemployment benefits and they 
provided direct financial support to their sons and daughters who were enrolled in the 
educational system or with temporary contracts in the labor market. The result was a 
drastic change in the organization of Spanish families, with a very important 
postponement of family formation for young people and a decrease of the fertility rate 
below 1.3, which is usually known as a lowest-low fertility rate (Garrido and Malo, 
2005; Billari and Kohler, 2004). 
This unequal distribution of job instability and unemployment by generations 
linked to adaptations and changes in family organization would be behind the ‘social 
peace’ of Spanish society, although the unemployment rate has been relatively high 
since the 1980s compared to other OECD countries (Garrido, 1996; Toharia and Malo, 
2000). However, a relevant cost of this ‘social peace’ has been a high aggregate TER 
linked with many structural problems of the Spanish economy (Toharia et al., 2005). 
 
3 Database and main variables: generation, age and educational level 
We use data from the Spanish LFS6
                                                 
6 In Spanish Encuesta de Población Activa, or EPA in short. 
 for the period 1987-2010, launched by the 
Spanish Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) following EUROSTAT 
standards that are based on International Labour Organization recommendations about 
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labour market statistics. The Spanish LFS covers the population residing in private 
households7
The LFS has information regarding the personal and labour characteristics of 
individuals (sex, age, employment status, employment characteristics of the main job, 
labour status, previous work experience, search for employment, etc.). In the second 
quarter of 1987 a question was added in order to capture the type of contract of the 
individual. Therefore, our empirical analysis begins with 1987 and it finish with 2010, 
and all observations correspond to the period following the implementation in 1984 of a 
labour market reform at the margin allowing a much easier use of temporary contracts. 
Therefore, these data do not allow any before-after analysis of this labour market 
reform, but we can observe what happens for different groups (here generations) along 
their working lives after the reform. Specifically, we can compare long-term results (in 
terms of their temporary employment rate) generations entering into the labour market 
after the implementation of the 1984 reform with generations already in the labour 
market when such reform was implemented. 
. The sample size each quarter is approximately 65,000 households (around 
200,000 individuals).  
As we want to focus on generations we define artificial (synthetic) cohorts and 
we follow them for the whole period covered by our database (1987 to 2010). For 
artificial or synthetic cohort analysis, it is not necessary to follow the same individuals 
over time. It is enough to simply observe a representative sample of individuals with the 
same characteristics over time (as the LFS does). For example, in the survey of year 1 
we have a representative picture of individuals aged 20-25. In the survey of year 2 we 
have a representative picture of individuals aged 21-26. As the sample of the survey is 
partially renewed, the interviewees are not exactly the same group in both years. 
However, they are equivalent from a statistical perspective, because in each year the 
sample is designed to give a right representation of population. If we define groups of 
individuals according to their birth cohort in the first available year, we can follow this 
group until the last available year (in our case, along 23 years, from 1987 to 2010)8
                                                 
7 Foreign nationals are included in the resident population if they have lived or intend to live in Spain for 
more than one year. 
. 
8 There is an implicit assumption in this reasoning: there is not any external shock adding new individuals 
to the birth cohorts. However, in Spain the proportion of foreign immigrants has grown significantly since 
2000, changing the composition of population living and working in Spain. In order to maintain the 
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Individuals are assigned to cohorts based on year of birth, from 1921 to 1995, 
each cohort consisting of 5 birth years. Later, in the econometric analysis, we will 
restrict ourselves to 12 generations, beginning with the 1926-30 birth years and ending 
with 1981-1985. We apply this restriction because we observe the oldest generations 
only at the end of their labour trajectory while for the youngest ones we only observe 
their first steps into the labour market. We aggregate data in cells considering age (in 5 
years intervals), educational level (3 levels), birth cohort and year. We use this 
aggregation for men and women separately. As we are not interested in seasonal 
changes of TER, we only take the second quarter of each year (as it is the trimester less 
affected by seasonality9). Concerning age variable, it consists of five-year groups from 
25-30 to 56-60. Notice that below 25 we would have many individuals enrolled in the 
education system (especially for those with university level) and beyond 60 early 
retirements become relatively frequent. Focusing on ages from 25 to 60 we observe 
individuals with a higher attachment to the labour market. On educational level, we 
consider three levels: up to the mandatory level, secondary level (post-mandatory 
secondary education and vocational training), and university level. We use only three 
levels in order to have enough observations in the corresponding cells, in special for the 
lowest level. Finally, we have for each gender, a dataset of 1,020 cells when restricting 
to 12 birth cohorts10
In Figures 2 and 3 we show the TER of the different generations for each age 
group
. Each cell is weighted using the weights provided by the LFS 
which are coherent for different years when using artificial cohorts (Garrido and Chuliá, 
2005). Weights are used in descriptive and econometric analyses. 
11
                                                                                                                                               
homogeneity of our birth cohorts along the whole time period, we restrict the analysis to Spanish 
individuals who were born in Spain. We exclude those not born in Spain because a non negligible 
proportion of immigrants from Latin America are eligible for double nationality and they usually apply 
for when they have the right to do so. 
 (for males and females, respectively). Cohorts younger than those born in 1961-
1965 (and, therefore, entering into the labour market once the 1984 reform was 
implemented) have the highest peaks in the TER. These cohorts have a TER above 70 
9 In fact, figures for the second quarter are the closest to the mean of the corresponding year. 
10 We have 1,020 cells instead of 4,140 (=24 years x 12 cohorts x 5 years intervals x 3 educational levels) 
because we can not follow all cohorts in all covered years. In fact older cohorts are mainly observed in 
the first part of the period while younger cohorts are mainly observed in the second part. This is also the 
reason to leave aside the oldest and the youngest cohorts and to restrict the dataset to 12 cohorts. 
11 In Figure 2, 3 and 4, successive five-year age groups overlap in order to have smoother shapes. 
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per cent until they are 22-26 years old. The rate decreases considerably until they are 
30-34 years old.  In this age group the TER becomes rather stable at a level of around 
30 per cent (slightly higher for women than for men).  
The incidence of temporary contracts by gender shows that women have a 
slower decreasing pattern in TER. In addition, female older cohorts born before 1956 
suffered a clear increase in TER immediately after the reform (notice that the first 
observation year for these cohorts is 1987). These differences are consistent with the 
higher TER observed with cross-section data in Figure 1. 
The level of education plays a major role in the labour market. It is well-known 
that a higher level of education leads to a greater probability of employment and the 
opportunity to secure better jobs. In this sense, in cross-section data, those with a 
university degree show a lower TER than the rest of the population (Dolado et al., 2002; 
Toharia et al., 2005). Figure 4 shows the TER for the two extremes of education up to 
the mandatory level and university (both by gender). For men and women the TER is 
much higher and remains higher for longer periods for individuals up to mandatory 
educational level in all cohorts. The difference is especially intense for older cohorts: 
while those with university level have a TER below 10 per cent when they are over 35 
years old, those up to mandatory educational level deal with rates over 20 per cent even 
at the end of their working careers. For cohorts born after 1956-60 we see that, in the 
case of those with a university level, there is a relatively rapid decrease in their TER, 
from 80 per cent when they are 16-20 years old to below 30 per cent when they are 30 
years old. Those up to mandatory educational level experiment the same high TER at 
the beginning of their employment trajectories but we do not observe the same decrease 
over time; on the contrary, these cohorts exhibit a relatively higher TER during their 
whole life cycle. So fixed-term contracts are the main way of entering the labour market 
for young cohorts independently of their level of education; the difference is that those 
with university studies improve their employment situation (in terms of job stability) 
rapidly while those with the lowest levels of education do not. By gender the general 
pattern by educational level is rather similar, although with a higher TER in each 
educational level and a slower decrease as age increase, especially for those women up 
to the mandatory educational level.    
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4 Econometric analysis  
4.1 A regression discontinuity design 
We will estimate the impact of the labour market reform at the margin on the 
average TER along the working life on different generations using a regression 
discontinuity design (RDD). Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we use the framework 
of treatment effects literature to present the main characteristics of the RDD. 
Let us consider an individual i (or a unit as a birth cohort) and two potential 
outcomes for this individual: Yi(1) if the individual or the unit is treated and Yi(0) 
otherwise. Of course, the causal effect of the treatment will be the difference Yi(1)- 
Yi(0). However, the basic problem is that we can not observe both results because an 
individual is only observed as treated or not treated. The empirical strategy consists of 
focusing on average effects of the treatment over two populations, treated and non-
treated groups. The difference Yi(1)- Yi(0) between both populations only captures the 
causal effect of the treatment if the characteristics of treated and non-treated populations 
are the same. Therefore, individuals or units must be as randomly assigned to the 
treatment and to the non-treatment (or control) group. 
In an RDD the randomization between treated and non-treated observations (the 
so-called ‘unconfoundedness’ assumption; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) is trivially 
satisfied if the discontinuity separating treated and non-treated groups is really 
exogenous and individuals can not manipulate their assignment into the treated and non-
treated groups. In fact, as Lee (2008) formally shows, RDD does not assume 
randomization, but it is a consequence of agents’ inability to precisely manipulate the 
assignment variable near the discontinuity cut off. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), 
when the variable used to assign the treatment is above a well defined threshold, the 
treatment dummy is always equal to 1. When the assignment variable is below the 
threshold, the treatment dummy is always equal to 0. Therefore, conditional on the 
assignment variable, there is not any other variation in the dummy treatment variable 
and, as the cut off defining the threshold is exogenously determined, it is not correlated 
with any other factor.  
Formally, considering that c is the cut off in the assignment variable Z we only 
observe E[Yi(1)|Z], for example, to the right of the cut off (the treatment group) and 
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E[Yi(0)|Z] to the left of the cut off. Defining as ε the bandwith around the cut off, the 
average causal effect of the treatment at the cut off c is the following: 
]|)0()1([]|[lim]|[lim
00
cZYYEcZYEcZYE iiiiii =−=+=−+= ↑↓ εε εε  
In words, we can estimate the average causal effect of the treatment defined by 
the discontinuity c if Z (and any other factor) is continuous and therefore the group of 
those right below the cut off (the non-treatment group) is a valid counterfactual for 
those right above the cut off (the treatment group). A consequence of this reasoning is 
that randomization in RDD is only strictly guaranteed in the vicinities of the cut off 
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Therefore, a crucial issue is the 
size of the bandwith around the cut off. However, a closer approach to the threshold has 
costs, because it will decrease the number of cases included in the estimations and, 
therefore, the precision of estimated coefficients might be much lower (standard errors 
will be larger). On the other hand, including cases far from the cut off will improve 
precision (standard errors will be smaller), but at the risk of losing ‘unconfoundedness’. 
When including more individuals far from the threshold, the likelihood of having other 
variables than the cut off affecting the outcome variable will be higher. The length of 
the bandwith in the assignment variable is a common problem in RDD. The classical 
solution consists of estimating models with different bandwiths and including some 
covariates as controls in estimations. Some authors (as Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 
2009) propose strictly quantitative methods to estimate the optimal bandwith. 
How do we confront in this research these usual worries of RDD? First, we 
explained at the beginning of the second section that the labour market reform at the 
margin implemented in 1984 was fully exogenous. Therefore, the key issue is how to 
define the cut off in meaningful terms of our research, that is, whether there are 
systematic differences in TER along the life cycle for generations entering into the 
labour market after the 1984 reform respect to those generations already in the labour 
market before the reform. 
The cut off is defined according to the assignment variable to the ‘treatment’. 
Therefore, the assignment variable is the age in 1984. As we are interested in results 
aggregated by birth cohort, our assignment variable is the mean age for each cell (by 
age group, cohort, educational level and year). The simplest definition of the cut off is 
the minimum legal age for working which is 16. Therefore, individuals with less than 
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16 in 1984 were fully exposed to the effects of the reform (a wider use of temporary 
contracts by firms) during their whole working lives. On the other hand, individuals 
with more than 16 years were potentially into the labour market when the reform was 
implemented and therefore they would be only affected if they lose their jobs or they 
have a delayed entry into the labour market.  
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that those following secondary level 
education and university education will have a delayed entry into the labour market 
respect to the minimum legal age to participate into the labour market in 1984. 
Therefore, we will estimate separate models for these individuals changing the cut off 
and considering the most common age finishing the corresponding educational levels: 
18 for secondary education and 23 for university education12
Figures 5 and 6 show the TER considering the assignment variable for the full 
sample and by educational levels for both genders, with different cut offs (16, 18 and 23 
in 1984). In all of them, the picture is rather different in both sides of the cut off. 
Maybe, the most remarkable difference is the higher dispersion for younger individuals 
especially for those with university level. However, for those up to the mandatory 
educational levels, observations with only a bit more than 16 years in 1984 have a 
dispersion rather similar to those entering in the labour market after 1984. In addition, 
in all cases for much older generations the concentration is in rather lower TER. For 
both genders, the picture is similar, although dispersion is larger for women irrespective 
of the educational level. Therefore, the visual examination of the outcome variable 
. Usually individuals enter 
into the labour market after finishing their studies, but for checking robustness of results 
we will also include estimations with the 16 years old cut off for the secondary and 
university levels and 18 years old also for the university level. As usual, the cut offs are 
defined as dummy variables where 1 means entering into the labour market after the 
implementation of the labour market reform (having less than 16, 18 or 23) and 0 the 
opposite. 
                                                 
12 Therefore, we are considering as 5 years the normal period for finishing university studies. In 1984, 
university studies usually lasted 5 years with two main exceptions. On one hand, some degrees lasted 3 
years (the so-called Diplomaturas). On the other hand, physicians, architects and some engineers lasted 6 
years. While the cut-offs of 16 and 18 are clear, there is more room for heterogeneity defining 23 years 
old in 1984 as the cut off for ending university studies and being exposed to the effects of the labour 
market reform at the margin. 
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provides a first approach to the eventual effects of the discontinuity (the labour market 
reform at the margin of 1984) on the outcome variable (TER). 
About the bandwith in the assignment variable (mean age), we have chosen a 
definition in terms of birth cohorts as this is more meaningful for our analysis than 
simply consider an interval of some years above and below the corresponding cut off. 
This will allow us a most direct link of the results with differences between generations. 
Anyway, we will check different possibilities including more or less birth cohorts in 
estimations, beginning with estimations including all generations. 
The econometric specification will be the following: 
acjtacjacjtacjtacjtacjtacjtacjt XAGEAGEAGEAGEAGEY εαβββ ++−++= '*)19841(*19841984 321
 
where a denotes age group, c corresponds to birth cohort, j is educational level, and, 
finally, t is time (year). All these variables and the aggregation procedure were 
described in section 3. 
We estimate this regression using OLS and we report results with robust 
standard errors, clustered when possible by birth cohort (defined as 5 year intervals as 
described in previous sections). In addition, we estimate different models by gender and 
three educational levels (up to the mandatory level, secondary education and university 
level). The left hand side variable, Y, is the TER. 
Our primary interest focuses on β1 as the coefficient of AGE1984, which is 
having a specific age for working in 1984 (the year the reform at the margin was 
implemented). As we explained before, we will use these different ages in 1984 (16, 18 
and 23) for different educational levels. As the above expression shows (see second and 
third terms), the assignment variable (defined as mean age in each cell centred at the 
corresponding cut off) can have a different form above and below the cut off age. 
We have considered a reduced set of covariates13
                                                 
13 Usually, covariates are included in RDD. However, notice that as ‘unconfoundedness’ is granted 
around the threshold of the assignment variable covariates should be redundant as treated and non-treated 
individuals would be as randomly selected considering any observable and not observable variable 
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). However, covariates are included to control some 
remaining heterogeneity for some variables especially relevant, as educational level, time trend and 
 (X): a set of dummies of the 
educational levels considered, a linear time trend, and step dummies for 1994, 1997 and 
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2006. The expected effect of education is a decrease in the TER when educational level 
increases. The rationale is that with a higher educational level workers are potentially 
more productive and more valuable for firms and, therefore, more suitable to sign an 
open-ended contract. We introduce step dummies in the three years previously 
mentioned to control for effects related with the legal regulation changes of these years, 
as some of them tried to affect to the relative use of temporary contracts (as we 
explained in the second section). However, these dummies are only controls and they 
are not a proper evaluation for the effects of such reforms. 
A common issue in RDD is that the results can be sensible to the specification of 
the model. This is the reason because some authors propose the use non-parametric 
models when using an RDD (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We have estimated some non-
parametric models and we will comment such results later14
Finally, as behaviour and outcomes of men and women in the labour market are 
markedly different, models have been estimated separately by gender. 
.  
4.2 Results and discussion 
We have to sets of results. The first one (Table 1) shows the estimations 
including all generations and clustering by 12 birth cohorts.  The second one (Table 2) 
includes the results considering only the closest cohorts to the corresponding cut off, but 
without clustering (because of the small number of clusters). 
Now, we comment Table 1. The above panel corresponds to males. Considering 
the 16 years cut off, the impact of the reform of 1984 ranges from an increase of 3.9 
percentage points (pp) in TER for the full sample and for those with lower educational 
level to an increase of 3.9 pp in TER for. The effect is stronger for secondary and 
university level for the 18 years cut off: a TER increase of 4.1 pp and 5.6 pp, 
respectively. Finally, the threshold of 23 years shows a smaller impact of 3.3 pp on the 
TER of males with university level. Therefore, in general the reform increased the job 
instability of cohorts entering into the labour market after the reform. To have a 
reference point to evaluate the meaning of these coefficients is useful to have a look 
                                                                                                                                               
before-after regulation changes in our case. Anyway, covariates should not have a discontinuity around 
the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). For the educational level, we have checked this continuity 
assumption with our data using graphs. They are available upon request. 
14 The non-parametric results are not included in the text but they are available upon request.  
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again to Figure 1. This Figure shows that for all men the observed TER was around 30 
percent for the most part of the decades of 1990s and 2000s. Therefore, although the 
estimated effects are not negligible (and for the 18 years cut off of university males it 
reaches 5.6 pp) they do not seem really large. A remarkable feature of these results is 
that the lowest educational level does not show a clearly higher effect and even it is 
lower than the most part of the estimated coefficients for the secondary and university 
level. At the same time in the first column, the estimation for all individuals, the lowest 
educational level has a fixed effect of 14.2 pp respect to the other two educational 
levels. Both types of results are not contradictory. While having up to the mandatory 
educational level increases TER in 14.2 pp respect to the other two educational levels, 
younger cohorts up to the mandatory level have a TER 3.9 pp higher than older cohorts 
up to the mandatory educational level. In a complementary way, although the university 
level is related with a lower TER (and higher job stability) respect to be below the 
secondary level, younger cohorts with university level have a higher TER than older 
cohorts with a university degree. In other words, they have higher job instability than 
their older counterparts. 
For females (second panel of Table 1), the impact of the 1984 reform is only 
statistically significant for those with university level. For this group of women the 
reform increased their TER from 5.1 pp to 6.7 pp (23 years and 18 years cut off, 
respectively). Also for women, the reform increased job instability for younger cohorts 
respect to older cohorts of women with a university level, although they have more job 
stability than women below the secondary level (as the estimation of the first column 
shows). However, for the rest of women the reform does not create a significant 
difference in TER between younger and older cohorts. 
As we explained in previous section, the effects of the discontinuity should be 
also checked considering data around the cut off. Table 2 shows the results considering 
exclusively 2 cohorts, 1961-65 and 1966-70, with the exception of individuals with a 
university degree considering the cut off of 23 years. For this last case, the two cohorts 
are 1956-60 and 1961-65, to have one cohort in both sides of the corresponding cut off. 
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In these estimations, standard errors are robust but they are not clustered by cohorts as 
we are only considering two cohorts15
The estimated effects shown in Table 2 are smaller than those reported in Table 
1. In special, for those with a university degree the estimated effect is very close to zero 
(0.66 pp for men and 0.91 pp for women)
. 
16
Thanks to Figures 7 (males) and 8 (females) we can compare the observed 
change in mean TER for different cohorts with the size of estimated effects related with 
the labour market reform at the margin. The black vertical line divides cohorts 
considered in estimations for the two lower educational levels and the grey vertical line 
does the same for the university level. For the lowest educational level and secondary 
education, the observed difference in the mean TER between 1961-65 and 1966-70 
cohorts is around the double of the change strictly linked with the labour market reform 
(for both genders). However, the observed difference in the mean TER between 1956-
60 and 1961-65 for individuals with university education is slightly below 10 pp (for 
both genders) but the estimated change in TER comparing both cohorts attributed to the 
labour market reform at the margin is below 1 pp.  
. For males, the effect is an increase of 2.38 
pp for those up to the mandatory educational level, and an increase from 3.37 to 3.62 pp 
for the secondary level (cut off of 16 and 18, respectively). For women, the estimated 
effect is negative but rather small (-1.44 pp) and positive for the cut off of 18 years for 
those with secondary level (2.88 pp). 
Definitely, these results as a whole do not support the view that the labour 
market reform at the margin has created a key difference among generations leaving 
younger cohorts in a sort of ‘permanent trap’ of precariousness. On the contrary, our 
results show that in the worst case the reform might explain an increase in the mean 
TER of younger generations of slightly below 4 pp for cohorts with secondary level 
strictly around the implementation of the reform. In special for the case of people with 
university level the observed differences in mean TER between cohorts are mainly 
                                                 
15 Because of cells’ weighting jointly with the lack of clustering all coefficients in Table 2 are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the precision of estimations of Tables 1 and 2 are not strictly comparable. 
16 Considering the other cut offs, the largest effect is for the cut off of 18 years (3.22 pp for men and 4.96 
for women). 
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related with differences in the characteristics of the cohorts and not with the reform at 
the margin. 
Finally, as a robustness check, we have estimated non-parametric models17 (not 
reported here but available upon request). In these estimations, the bandwiths are 
narrower18
 
 than those considered in estimations shown in Tables 1 and 2. The effect of 
the labour market reform at the margin is either non significant or slightly negative (but 
always very close to zero) for the mandatory educational level and the secondary level. 
For the university level, the estimated effect of the reform was positive and around 2 pp. 
Therefore, although non-parametric models provide results a bit different than those 
obtained with the lineal models of Tables 1 and 2, they do not change the main 
conclusion for those with university level, as the effect of the labour market reform at 
the margin is very low compared to the observed difference shown in Figures 7 and 8. 
However, these non-parametric results do not compare different cohorts (as we wanted) 
but cells inside a specific narrower bandwith around the corresponding cut off, and 
therefore they do not have an interpretation in terms of birth cohorts as the rest of our 
results. 
5 Conclusions  
In this research we have analysed the incidence of temporary employment across 
generations and the long-term impact of a labour market reform easing the use of 
temporary contracts by firms. Our data come from Spain where this type of labour 
market reform was implemented in 1984 and where the temporary employment rate has 
been among the highest in Europe in the last two decades. We evaluate the impact of 
this reform at the margin on different generations (defined as birth cohorts). As a reform 
at the margin only affects to those entering (or re-entering) into the labour market, we 
focus on the comparison of those entering into the labour market after the 
                                                 
17 For our estimations we have used the ‘rd’ command for Stata developed by Nichols (2011). The ‘rd’ 
command allows estimating local linear regression models on both sides of the cut off, using a triangle 
kernel. In addition, we have also used the syntax programs provided by G. Imbens in his personal web 
page: (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/imbens/imbens.html), which is based in the notes by 
Fuji et al. (2009). 
18 The default bandwidth of the command ‘rd’ is based on Fuji et al. (2009) to minimize MSE, or squared 
bias plus variance, in a sharp RD design. 
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implementation of the reform at the margin and those already in the labour market in 
1984. Therefore, we are not providing a comparison before-after the reform nor a 
counterfactual of what would have happened without such reform, but a comparison of 
workers at the margin and workers only at the margin if they lose their job or have a 
delayed entry into the labour market. 
For this evaluation we use micro-data of the Spanish Labour Force Survey to 
define artificial or synthetic birth cohorts from 1987 to 2010. We follow for this period 
12 birth cohorts (defined as 5 years groups). There are relevant observed differences by 
gender, as women usually have a higher TER along their working lives almost 
irrespective of their birth cohort. Descriptive differences by educational level are 
remarkable. For those up to the mandatory educational level, the TER increased 
relatively rapidly after the implementation of the reform for older cohorts (those already 
in the labour market in 1984) and for those entering after the reform at the margin the 
TER was initially relatively high and slowly decreasing as age increases. For those with 
a university degree, TER remained almost unchanged for older cohorts after the reform, 
and although for younger cohorts the TER is very high at the beginning of their working 
life, it decreases at a faster pace as age increases. 
Econometric estimations of the effect of the labour market reform at the margin 
are based on a regression discontinuity design. The discontinuity is the reform as it can 
be considered as exogenous respect to the behaviour of workers and firms. We define 
the cut off as the entering age into the labour market by educational level (16 for those 
up to the mandatory educational level, 18 for those with secondary level, and 23 for 
those with a university degree). The estimated impact on the mean TER for cohorts 
entering into the labour market after the legal change of 1984 is relatively small and it is 
not supportive of the view that the reform has heavily affected to younger generations 
creating a long-term relevant increase in TER along their working lives. Especially, this 
is not true for those with a university degree. Although for those with university level 
the observed difference between the cohort entering after the reform and the cohort 
already in the labour market is the largest one (around 10 percentage points), almost the 
whole difference is related with differences between both cohorts and not with the 
discontinuity created by the labour market reform at the margin of 1984. In the 
vicinities of the cut off of 23 years in 1984, the effect strictly related with the reform at 
the margin is 0.66 percentage points for males and 0.91 for females. 
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Of course, these results do not support that this reform was ‘good’ or ‘positive’ 
for the welfare of individuals. That is a different question concerning a comparison of 
the observed results under the reform and a counterfactual scenario without such reform 
(or with a reform for all and not at the margin). Our results are based in comparisons 
with data obtained after the implementation of the reform for all cohorts. Therefore, our 
regression discontinuity analysis stresses that observed differences in mean TER for 
different cohorts (in special for those with university level) is mainly related with 
differences between cohorts entering after and before the implementation of the labour 
market reform at the margin of 1984 and not strictly with a heavy impact of the easier 
use of temporary contracts on younger cohorts. 
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Table 1. Regression Discontinuity results on the TERajct (weighted data and clustered errors by 12 birth cohorts). 
MALES ALL  EDUC1  EDUC2  EDUC2  EDUC3  EDUC3  EDUC3  
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0,039 ** 0,039 ** 0,038 ***   0,058 ***     
Cut off: 18 years in 1984       0,041 ***   0,056 **   
Cut off: 23 years in 1984             0,033 *** 
Age*(1-Cut off) -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,007 *** 
Age*(Cut off) 0,010 *** 0,004 *** 0,010 *** 0,011 *** 0,019 *** 0,018 *** 0,018 *** 
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0,142 ***             
Educ2: Secondary level -0,003              
Linear time trend -0,007 *** -0,006 *** -0,008 *** -0,008 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** -0,009 *** 
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0,065 *** 0,073 *** 0,046  0,046  0,045  0,045  0,045  
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) -0,026  -0,028 ** -0,023  -0,024  -0,013  -0,014  -0,014  
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) -0,038 *** -0,045 *** -0,023  -0,023  -0,032  -0,031  -0,032  
Constant 0,290 *** 0,423 *** 0,309 *** 0,284 *** 0,305 *** 0,275 *** 0,201 *** 
R2 0,7804  0,8119  0,7256  0,7302  0,729  0,7372  0,7505  
N 607665  351019  152004  152004  104642  104642  104642  
FEMALES ALL  EDUC1  EDUC2  EDUC2  EDUC3  EDUC3  EDUC3  
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0,0365  0,0344  0,0014    0,0586 **     
Cut off: 18 years in 1984       0,0208    0,0696 ***   
Cut off: 23 years in 1984             0,0515 *** 
Age*(1-Cut off) -0,0102 *** -0,0083 *** -0,0120 *** -0,0116 *** -0,0140 *** -0,0129 *** -0,0098 *** 
Age*(Cut off) 0,0106 *** 0,0009  0,0080 *** 0,0075 *** 0,0184 *** 0,0181 *** 0,0199 *** 
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0,1185 ***             
Educ2: Secondary level -0,0049              
Linear time trend -0,0069 *** -0,0047 *** -0,0063 ** -0,0063 ** -0,0107 *** -0,0108 *** -0,0106 *** 
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0,0493 ** 0,0577 *** 0,0520 * 0,0512 * 0,0290  0,0286  0,0299  
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) -0,0215  -0,0363 *** -0,0267  -0,0268  0,0070  0,0059  0,0074  
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) -0,0279 * -0,0215 *** -0,0253  -0,0245  -0,0360  -0,0346  -0,0374  
Constant 0,3685 *** 0,4514 *** 0,3832 *** 0,3542 *** 0,4229 *** 0,3804 *** 0,2776 *** 
R2 0,7134  0,7785  0,7319  0,7333  0,8149  0,8231  0,8330  
N 368249  156096  100433  100433  111720  111720  111720  
*** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **at the 5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  Reform variables are step dummies (1=year of the reform onwards). 
a: age group, j: educational level, c: birth-cohort (generation), t: time (year). EDUC3: University educational level.   
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Table 2. Regression Discontinuity results on the TERajct (weighted data and robust standard errors; 2 birth cohorts). 
MALES ALL  EDUC1  EDUC2  EDUC2  EDUC3  EDUC3  EDUC3* 
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 0,0231  0,0238  0,0337    0,0051     
Cut off: 18 years in 1984       0,0362    0,0322   
Cut off: 23 years in 1984             0,0066 
Age*(1-Cut off) -0,0205  -0,0199  -0,0179  -0,0163  -0,0274  -0,0233  -0,0142 
Age*(Cut off) -0,0129  -0,0258  -0,0122  0,0060  0,0136  0,0170  0,0191 
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0,1522             
Educ2: Secondary level -0,0106             
Linear time trend -0,0149  -0,0130  -0,0153  -0,0153  -0,0215  -0,0215  -0,0097 
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0,0511  0,0708  0,0252  0,0301  0,0197  0,0211  -0,0155 
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) -0,0581  -0,0546  -0,0565  -0,0626  -0,0619  -0,0635  -0,0224 
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) 0,0070  -0,0163  0,0313  0,0325  0,0422  0,0424  0,0379 
Constant 0,4785  0,5952  0,4757  0,4343  0,6083  0,5428  0,2661 
R2 0,8745  0,8504  0,8639  0,8591  0,8193  0,8199  0,7413 
N 164714  82448  53875  53875  28391  28391  33304 
FEMALES ALL  EDUC1  EDUC2  EDUC2  EDUC3  EDUC3  EDUC3* 
Cut off: 16 years in 1984 -0,0096  -0,0144  -0,0200    0,0140     
Cut off: 18 years in 1984       0,0288    0,0496   
Cut off: 23 years in 1984             0,0091 
Age*(1-Cut off) -0,0205  -0,0172  -0,0153  -0,0124  -0,0306  -0,0261  -0,0181 
Age*(Cut off) 0,0040  -0,0056  0,0065  -0,0004  0,0043  0,0125  0,0208 
Educ1: Up to mandatory educ. level 0,1105             
Educ2: Secondary level -0,0048             
Linear time trend -0,0122  -0,0075  -0,0114  -0,0114  -0,0197  -0,0197  -0,0102 
Reform 1994 (1=Yes) 0,0321  0,0503  0,0363  0,0365  -0,0064  -0,0032  -0,0375 
Reform 1997 (1=Yes) -0,0378  -0,0334  -0,0570  -0,0560  -0,0158  -0,0197  0,0124 
Reform 2006 (1=Yes) 0,0057  -0,0169  0,0206  0,0195  0,0222  0,0229  0,0251 
Constant 0,5242  0,5541  0,5022  0,4634  0,6631  0,5896  0,3320 
R2 0,7930  0,8354  0,7999  0,7997  0,8559  0,8571  0,8088 
N 118579  42697  39456  39456  36426  36426  38420 
Robust standard errors. Weighted data. All coefficients are statistically significant.  Reform variables are step dummies (1=year of the reform onwards).a: age group, j: educational level, c: birth-cohort (generation), t: 
time (year). EDUC3: University educational level.  
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Figure 1. TER by gender in Spain. Source: LFS. 
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Figure 2. Temporary employment rate by generation (as five years birth cohort groups) and by age group, for males. Source: LFS. 
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Figure 3. Temporary employment rate by generation (as five years birth cohort groups) and by age group, for females. Source: LFS. 
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Figure 4. Temporary employment rate by birth cohort and age group for two educational levels, by gender. Source: LFS. 
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Figure 5. Temporary Employment Rates by educational level with the corresponding cut offs (only males). 
All (males) Up to mandatory level (males) 
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Figure 6. Temporary Employment Rates by educational level with the corresponding cut offs (only females). 
All (females) Up to mandatory level (females) 
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Figure 7. Mean Temporary Employment Rate for the whole life cycle of all cohorts by educational level (only males).  
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Figure 8. Mean Temporary Employment Rate for the whole life cycle of all cohorts by educational level (only females). 
